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Abstract 
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. 
Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of 
democracy have underestimated the complexity of the Dahlian dimension of inclusiveness, a sine-qua-
non condition for defining a polyarchy. Firmly anchored in the literature and democratic theory, this 
measurement paper proposes a new index of inclusiveness: Electoral Residential Inclusiveness. This measure 
assesses how large the overlap between those who make the law and those who are subject to it is. It is 
shown how some regimes—including some of those that have been systematically considered strong 
democracies—exhibit such a considerable gap between these two groups that their democratic credentials 
should be questioned. This index has a clear impact on the way we measure and, most important, 
understand democracies. Unpacking this forgotten dimension, this work helps to fine tune the efforts to 
measure democracies. 
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1. Theoretical Puzzle 
Since the enormously influential work of Robert Dahl (1971), democracy has been conceptualized as a 
competitive/contested and participatory/inclusive regime. In the absence of any of these attributes, it is 
impossible to talk about polyarchy. Both dimensions are necessary for democracy, so neither is sufficient. 
A competitive regime without broad inclusion constitutes a competitive oligarchy; an inclusive system 
absent competition constitutes an inclusive hegemony. From the participatory angle, although universal 
suffrage has become one of the mantras of contemporary democracies, this is no more than an ideal 
point of reference, since every regime limits membership in the political community in some way or 
another (for example, through age requirements to vote).  
If a significant portion of adults in a polity enjoys political rights—at least, the ability to vote and 
hold office —we assume that the Dahlian inclusion requirements are met. As many authors argue that 
universal suffrage can be taken for guaranteed in the post-1945 era, the literature quickly jumps to the 
analysis of the second dimension of polyarchy: competitiveness. Indeed, the literature on democracy and 
democratization has paid more attention to the competitive dimension than to inclusion. This imbalance 
was already noticed by Munck and Verkuilen almost 20 years ago: “the fact of not including participation 
in its various facets is a problem even for the study of democracy in recent times” (2002: 11).2  
Although democracy has witnessed a constant struggle between those who wish to extend the 
limits of the demos and those who want to restrict them, the universality of suffrage is widely accepted as 
desirable.3 Nonetheless, discussing democracy also involves considering the boundaries of who belongs 
to the democratic “club” (Blatter et al. 2015; Coppedge et al. 2008). In other words, the discussion is 
about the shape of the political community and its members, the citizens, something that has been known 
as the “boundary problem” (Simmons 2013), which for Walzer constitutes “the first and most important 
distributive question” (1983: 31).4 
Virtually every democracy has witnessed moments of high exclusion. Traditionally, the limitation 
was based on gender, property, or literacy (sometimes even on religion or ethnic origin). Today, hardly 
                                                        2  Perhaps the literature has delved into the competitive aspects of democracy rather than the participative dimension 
due to a participatory bias caused by the trauma lived during the Weimar Republic, which collapsed against fascism, 
and the enforced totalitarian participation in post-war Eastern Europe (Pateman 1970: 2).  
3  Even though some contemporary voices argue against it (e.g., Brennan 2011).  
4  Citizenship has become such a divided concept that it inevitably leads to confusion (Bosniak 2006: 3). Citizenship—
“a bouquet of ideals” in the words of Pedroza (2019)—is a polysemic concept, and it is not my interest to discuss its 
genealogy, dimensions, and interpretations in this work. Nor am I interested in dealing with how citizenship is 
acquired; for an in-depth study on citizenship regimes, see Vink (2017).  
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anyone would define a regime as democratic where, for example, women could not vote. This does not 
mean that there is a universal progressive movement towards greater inclusion. Who belongs to the 
political community remains a highly divisive issue, including, for example, over criminal offenders. It is 
clear that the battle for suffrage has not come to an end; it is only fought along different fronts (Schmid 
et al. 2019; Beckman 2009).5  
While there is no unique pattern in how struggles for enfranchisement have evolved, it is possible 
to identify at least three battles: class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Collier 1999), gender (Banaszak 
1996; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Schwindt-Bayer and Reyes-Housholder 2017), and race (Bateman 2018; 
Valelly 2004; Lublin 1999). Despite their differences, these studies address realities where individuals and 
groups cannot de jure participate in the electoral game. This has not been uncommon in competitive 
regimes.   
Exclusion acquires a new significance in the context of mass migrations, but migrations have not 
been a necessary condition for exclusion. If we return to the essays of Simmel (1908) on the stranger (das 
Fremde) or the writings of Marx (1843) on the Jewish question, we find that the idea that certain individuals 
are members of society but not members of the political community is an ancient concern in the social 
sciences. This concern remains fundamental for the understanding of contemporary citizenship, and mass 
migrations make the problem even more evident.  
This work claims that political rights of migrants are the latest frontier in enfranchisement. At a 
time when mass migrations have acquired unprecedented dimensions and visibility (e.g., Venezuela, Syria, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa), the democracies that absorb migratory flows put under immense stress. These 
waves present a challenge to democratic theory as they imbalance the relationship between those who 
decide who will make the laws (sometimes making them directly) and those who are affected by them. 
Of course, migration not only unbalances the receiving communities but also changes the societies of 
origin; “migration adds noncitizens to the resident population and emigration adds non-residents to the 
citizenry” (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017: 619).  
In many societies that we consider healthy democracies, significant portions of the population 
lacks fundamental political rights (Blatter et al. 2017).6 In some cases, like Switzerland, the exclusion from 
                                                        5  After all, citizenship is, in the words of Wimmer, a form of legalized discrimination (2013: 74); or, using Kochenov’s 
words (2019), “the story of citizenship as a tale not of liberation, dignity, and nationhood but of complacency, 
hypocrisy, and domination.”  
6  It is crucial to notice that the foci of study at this stage are political rights at the national level only. A complete world 
is found at the subnational level but falls well beyond the scope of this research. This is to say, when I am talking 
about enfranchisement, I am referring to the electoral right provided to participate in the highest levels of 
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the political game affects up to 30% of the community and includes even third-generation immigrants 
(Nguyen 2016). Moreover, it could be the case that someone's grandfather arrived in Switzerland a 
century ago yet her grandchild—born in Switzerland, as her parents—cannot vote at the federal level 
(not to mention the possibility of running for elected office).  
Imagine a hypothetical situation where, due to a crisis of magnitude, a significant percentage of 
the Swiss citizenry leaves the country and those who stay are mostly non-citizen residents (many of these 
cannot emigrate because they do not have a passport from Switzerland or any other country).7 Under this 
scenario, most of the citizens would be non-residents (with political rights), and the majority of the 
inhabitants of the country would be non-citizen residents (without political rights). Could we continue to 
consider that country such a high-quality democracy as it is typically considered today?8   
The Swiss example serves as a springboard for the central question of this research: How small 
should this gap be so as not to severely violate the principle of equality in a political community to such 
a degree that it would be impossible to define a regime as democratic? Following the literature, and for 
the sake of parsimony, this work divides a given society into three different groups of people: resident 
citizens (RC), non-citizen residents (NC), and non-resident citizens (NR). While each political community 
has had different combinations of these three groups since ancient times, current trends of immigration, 
seem to make the differences more acute.  Robert Dahl explains,  
Both historically and contemporaneously, regimes also vary in the proportion of the population 
entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of 
the government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public contestation. A scale reflecting 
the breadth of the right to participate in public contestation would enable us to compare different 
regimes according to their inclusiveness (Dahl 1971: 4). 
 
                                                        
policymaking. If in a given country, permanent non-citizen residents vote at the local or municipal level only, I do 
not count these individuals as enfranchised.  
7  See: https://goo.gl/k8Qofi [Accessed, May 5, 2019]. Note that this group of people does not have a Swiss 
passport, and they only have what is known as a Permit C (“Ausweis C”) for permanent residence. Concerning this 
particular group, some authors speak of “denizenship” (Hammar 1990). This concept implies “a status of 
residential quasi-citizenship combined with external formal citizenship” (Bauböck 2007: 2396). See also Pedroza 
(2019).  
8  Looking at the problem differently, perhaps a bit more realistically, there are Arab Gulf States that have more 
foreigners than citizen residents. What if one of these states finally introduced democratic institutions? For 
example, about 90% of the United Arab Emirates’ population is foreign born (constituted mainly of 38.2% Indian, 
Egyptian 10.2%, Bangladeshi 9.5%, Pakistani 9.4%, among other smaller communities.) See: 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/country-resource/united-arab-emirates [Accessed, May 8, 2020].  
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Figure 1 sketches four scenarios related to the relationship between the three types of persons in different 
historical times. Figure 1a depicts the typical, classic example of Athens, where citizens were a clear 
minority within a highly disenfranchised society (women, slaves, metics, etc.). Figure 1b describes most 
nation-states before immigration waves. Figure 1c portrays the current situation where diasporas have 
increased their relative size. Finally, Figure 1d depicts a potential future, as described above, with the 
hypothetical crises in Switzerland. Nonetheless, in times with highly porous borders and increasing 
transmigration, we must reconsider the transit from 1b to 1c, and even 1d.9  
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By definition, the resident citizens are the members of the democratic club (and in several places, these 
citizens extend the membership to the non-resident citizens).10 Indeed, with the increasing size of 
diasporas around the world (Mégret and Girard 2014; Sheffer 2003), a plethora of contextual, “country-
specific factors concerning the history and nature of the relationship between the government and 
emigrant groups are usually determinant” (Collyer 2013).  
                                                        9  The leitmotif of the literature on democratization has focused on the study of the transition from figure 1a to figure 
1b. However, this literature, especially its comparative and empirical works, has not been sensitive enough to post-
1b scenarios.  
10  While the first antecedents of the extra-territorial vote could be found as far back as the Roman Republic (Ellis 2007), 
its modern manifestation comes from the American Civil War when the State of Wisconsin allowed its militias 
fighting in the South to exercise their vote (Alvarez et al. 2007). Nonetheless, the contemporary wave became evident 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Virtually every conceptualization and index of democracy works primarily with citizens and does 
not take into consideration groups temporarily or permanently excluded from the most fundamental 
political rights that reside in a polity. I claim that the exclusion (or incorporation) of the typically 
marginalized—e.g., immigrants—may affect the overall democratic level of a regime. Concentrating on 
migrants does not mean that other categories of people temporarily excluded from the political game, 
such as the military, the clergy, and persons with cognitive disabilities, are not eventually crucial for 
assessing the democratic level of a regime. Nonetheless, as clearly explained elsewhere (e.g., López-
Guerra 2014), their exclusion responds to different normative principles and political realities.  
 
1.b. How should the demos be constituted? 
Electoral rights are usually associated with citizenship and residential status. With the category of resident 
citizens, there is no problem whatsoever. No democrat would agree that citizens—understood as a state 
of full membership in a self-governed political community (Bauböck 2005: 683)—should not have 
electoral rights. Of course, there is an unresolved and loud normative discussion regarding to what degree 
citizens belonging to certain categories (e.g., the military, the clergy, inmates, ex-felons, and children) 
should enjoy these rights.   
If the extension of electoral rights is a normative headache with some subgroups of society, the 
primary concern relates to non-citizen residents (“denizens”) and non-resident citizens (“expats”). In 
general, the literature has justified the extension of electoral rights either to all those whose interests 
(potential or actual) are affected by political decisions or to all those who are subject to political coercion. 
Knowing that the claim for “affected interest” is a rather elastic concept, which “would mean giving 
virtually everyone everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere” (Goodin 2007: 68), its 
advocates tend to recur either to an ethnical relationship and/or to a material connection.  
As Bauböck clearly states, affected interest justifies granting the voice mechanism but not 
necessarily political rights per se. “Taking interests into account does not entail turning all whose interests 
are affected into members of the demos who authorize a government in representative elections. Affected 
interests are sufficient to substantiate a claim to voice rather than vote” (Bauböck 2015: 823).11  
Thus, explicitly following Robert Dahl’s democratic theory, the adopted criterion for democratic 
inclusion entails being subject to the political coercion of the state. Dahl’s theory strictly states that, except 
                                                        
11  For a detailed critical view of the principle of affected interests (see López-Guerra 2014: Chapter 4).  
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for transients and persons with severe cognitive disabilities, “every adult subject to a government and its 
laws must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified right to be, a member of the demos” 
(Dahl 1989: 127). Likewise, Michael Walzer argues that “the process of self-determination through which 
a democratic state shapes its internal life, must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women 
who live within its territory, work in the local economy and are subject to the local law” (Walzer 1983: 
60).12  
In adopting the principle of being subject to the political coercion of the State as the source for 
the extension of electoral rights, I explicitly circumvent any material or ethnically based concept of voting 
rights. And this is precisely the point where the state enters the game. Given that I am particularly 
concerned with assessing the level of inclusion, which in turn affects the level of democracy in the context 
of the “state,” this paper concentrates on how democratic a polity is, instead of how democratic a group 
of people is. In other words, this research is not interested in answering, for example, how democratic 
Argentineans are, but instead how democratic Argentina is. There is a subtle, but still crucial difference 
between both questions that, as we will see, has been overlooked by the comparative literature. 
The confusion between the democratic nature of a particular group of people on the one hand 
and a polity on the other comes from an inertial association of citizenship, nationality, and voting rights; 
but the fact is that none are contingent on another.13 The fact there are stable democracies where there 
is no need to be a citizen or national to have electoral rights helps to make the point. This is the case in 
Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay, three strong democracies by virtually any standard.14  
Nonetheless, there is a sine-qua-non link between democracy, voting rights, and residency, 
understood as a proxy for being subject to the laws and binding decisions of the polity. Strongly anchored 
in the literature and democratic theory, this research considers that both resident citizens and non-citizen 
                                                        12  This point of view would most likely be endorsed by an eclectic group such as (Bryce 1921), (Schumpeter 1942), 
(Dahl 1989), (Huntington 1991), (Markoff 1999, 1996), to mention just a few.  
13  The literature is manifest in showing how they transit different avenues, even though they have been intermingled. 
This is not to neglect the intensive national or ethnic bond between an individual and a particular people or nation 
that may be, under certain circumstances, “more important for them than their role as non-citizen residents” (Collyer 
2013: 56). On the contrary: we can accept that nations and peoples have the right to strengthen their cultural, national, 
and linguistic bond with those it considers members of their “family.”  
14  In these countries, permanent non-citizen residents do not have to naturalize to have an electoral say, as any resident 
citizen. It is interesting to note that all countries that extended electoral rights to non-citizen residents belong to the 
global south (Uruguay the very first in 1934, then New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, and Ecuador in 2008), 
strengthening Markoff’s hypothesis that many of the great institutional innovations “have generally not taken place 
in the world’s centers of wealth and power” (Markoff 1999: 663).  
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residents (provided they have lived in the place for some time) should have equal voting rights.15 Likewise, 
permanent non-resident citizens should not have the right to change policies for those who suffer them.16  
Table 1 distributes the top 20 democracies in the year 2018 according to the Electoral Democracy Index 
of V-Dem (v.9) according to whether they grant non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents electoral 
rights. The cell names correspond to the typology of electorate elaborated by Caramani and Grotz (2015: 
803). It must be said that this is an oversimplification of reality that hinders substantial normative 
discussions. For example, those who do not support the idea of denizens having electoral rights might 
be strong advocates for them to naturalize automatically in a relatively short period. Others, however, 
accept naturalization but only based on an ad-hoc, voluntary action (depending on specific personal 
attributes, such as speaking the local language, or have proficiency in history of the hosting country) and 
just after a relatively long time.   
 
Table 1. Top-20 democracies and extension of voting rights to non-residents and non-citizen 
residents 
  Denizens –  
Non-Citizen Residents voting rights 
  Yes No 
Expatriates -  
Non-Resident 
Citizens voting 
rights 
Yes [National and Resident 
Electorate] 
 
CHI, NZL 
[National Electorate] 
 
NOR, SWE, EST, CRI, CHE, 
GBR, LUX, PRT, ITA, BEL, 
AUS, ISL, NLD, FIN, CAN 
No [Resident Electorate] 
 
URY 
[National-resident Electorate] 
 
DNK, IRL 
1.c. The Elephant in the Room: Inclusiveness in Current Measures of Democracy 
The study of inclusiveness lags far behind its theoretical and empirical importance. Despite the fact that 
it is accepted that “democracy without the inclusion of most of ‘the people,’ or without liberties that 
                                                        15  For different perspectives supporting the extension of the vote to denizens, see Munro (2008) and Song (2009).  
16  By permanent non-resident citizens I refer to people without prospects of returning to their origin. Therefore, there 
are in some instances, such as students or members of diplomatic staff abroad might have this particular right. Also, 
as López-Guerra contends, there are “specific cases that it would be not only permissible but also required to 
enfranchise expatriates (e.g., in the first few national elections in a country that experienced a civil conflict leading to 
mass deportations)” (2014: 100). Nonetheless, I have to recognize that taking this position, I am challenging a 
significant literature that sees external voting as something intrinsically good, almost as a matter of political 
correctness. But, as explained above, I do not find any superior normative democratic theory why voting rights 
should be ethnically based.  
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make elections meaningful, is an oxymoron” (Teorell et al. 2019: 75), even the most sophisticated 
measures of democracy have not been to the gap between non-citizen residents, non-resident citizens, 
and residents of contemporary regimes.17 The lack of sharpness, probably due to conceptual inheritances 
from times when migration was not as critical as is today, strongly distorts the image we have of 
contemporary democracies.  
While most conceptualizations of democracy consider inhabitants as the subjects of political 
rights, at the stage of operationalization of their indicators, they only consider citizens. Moreover, several 
studies use “people,” “inhabitants,” or “citizens” as synonyms, without considering how substantially 
different concepts they are, mainly when speaking about electoral rights. 
Until recent times, the exclusion of the poor and women in early democracies were typical 
historical examples of disenfranchisement. As pointed out by Ersson and Lane (2013), the starting point 
of the democratic government itself changes dramatically depending on whether or not we include 
women’s suffrage as a necessary condition for democracy. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) argue that 
the criteria of democratic government change over time, so universal suffrage for adult males can be 
considered sufficient to codify the level of democracy in a case at the end of the nineteenth century, but 
insufficient to the late twentieth century. These authors show that well-established democracies end up 
not granting full political rights to a significant part of their populations, and it can be added that such 
exclusion is biased against groups that are often not privileged.18   
Przeworski and colleagues do not consider participation whatsoever. For them, a regime is 
democratic if (1) the chief executive is elected (directly or indirectly), (2) the lower house of the legislature 
is also elected (the upper house is not included), and (3) more than one party participates in the elections 
(Alvarez et al. 1996: 7-8). Likewise, Polity IV (Marshall 2014), the Political Regime Dataset (Gasiorowski 
1996), and Bollen (1979) do not consider the scope of suffrage, leaving aside half of Dahl's dimensions 
to define polyarchy and making their concept quite narrow if they wanted to approximate democracy in 
the Dahlian sense.  
Recognizing these limitations, Boix, Miller, and Rosato (BMR) made an addendum that limits 
democracies to those regimes that have adult male suffrage higher than 50% (2013). There is no question                                                         17  On the gap between territory and political community, see Collyer (2013); on the extraterritorial vote, see Bauböck 
(2003), López-Guerra (2005, 2014), Rubio-Marín (1998); and on the existence of a clear double standard concerning 
dual citizenship, see Vink et al. (2019).  
18  Therefore, we have to be careful in adjusting the criteria for assessing whether a democracy existed in a given place 
and time using extra-temporal definitions. Actually, “a critical and yet under-theorized issue in classifying democracies 
is whether scholars should use international standards for a given period (we call this a retrospective standard) or 
today’s international standards” (Mainwaring et al. 2001: 40-41). See also Paxton (2000).  
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that BMR are more in tune with Dahl's polyarchy, but not as much as recent works by Bernhard et al. 
(Bernhard et al. 2016; Bernhard et al. 2001), where for a regime to be considered democratic, more than 
50% of the entire adult population must be included in the vote.19 While a majority/minority democratic 
logic informs these thresholds, they still seem arbitrary, and the question is, why not consider 75% instead 
of 50% in the granting of political rights?  Of course, discussions on what percentage best represents the 
democratic ideal and where to set the thresholds could be endless. Nonetheless, if we seriously follow 
Dahl’s criteria for whom to label a regime as a “complete” polyarchy the inclusion of 90% of the adult 
population with basic political rights is a must (Dahl 1971: Table A-1), then virtually no Western 
European country could be considered a full democracy, regardless how extensive other rights are (civil 
or social, a-la-Marshall (1950) or Bendix (1964)).  
It can be observed that whether participation is a constitutive part of the concept of democracy 
divides, in broad lines, the empirical literature. On the one hand, some explicitly focus on the competitive 
dimension of the regime and leave participation aside, such as Polity IV (Marshall 2014) and Przeworski 
et al. (2000), two of the most-used databases. On the other hand, there are those for whom participation 
is a constitutive aspect of democracy. This group is subdivided into those who measure participation 
relative to inhabitants and those who measure relative to citizens. Among the former, we find those that 
consider the percentage of votes over the total population (Vanhanen 1997) and those who estimate the 
portion of the vote on the voting-age population: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) and Bühlmann 
et al. (2012). However, these measures fail to capture the degree of inclusiveness, as it is conflated with 
the vote itself. Finally, there is a group of studies that, while acknowledging the importance of inclusion, 
either do not measure it (Freedom Since 1972) or, if they do it, their measures are based on those who 
are already citizens (Teorell et al. 2019).  
Due to all these limitations, and unlike previous studies that set an arbitrary cutoff point between 
democratic categories (complete, hybrid, etc.), I propose a new measure—electoral residential inclusiveness 
(ERI)—that examines the ratio between resident citizens on the one hand and the percentage of non-
citizen residents and non-resident citizens of a polity. The proposed measure is well-rooted in the 
literature as it introduces a dimension whereby adults may become the masters of their political fate while 
avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Considering 
                                                        
19  For this to occur, at least some women have to be enfranchised. Their idea is specifically written so a country would 
not be considered a democracy if it disenfranchised all women. Actually, there is only one country in their dataset 
that only partially disenfranchises women – UK which did so early in the interwar era by only letting women over 35 
votes. Younger women were later enfranchised.  
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this correction would make current measures of democracy more attuned with the core democratic 
tradition and the messiness of contemporary societies.  
 
2. Measuring the Index of Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) 
This work seeks to update the current indices of democracy by unpacking the dimension of inclusiveness 
and fine-tuning it with the contemporary migration trends. Current measures of democracy have not 
tackled the so-called “democratic boundary problem,” probably because migration was not such an 
evident problem when most of these procedures were designed. It is argued that, as explained above, an 
increasing gap between those who decide the norms of a given society and those who must abide by that 
legislation reduces the democratic soil of this particular territory.  
2.a. Index 
The index of Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) is the percentage of resident citizens over the whole 
electorate (which includes also non-resident citizens) by the percentage of resident citizens over all the 
adult population subject to the reach of the state and its laws. The maximum value this index can reach 
is one and the minimum zero (either because the whole demos is beyond the territory of a country or 
simply because there is no demos, or both). To understand how this index works, let us think on a 
hypothetical case represented in Figure 2. 
Non-Citizens 
Residents (NC)
Non-Resident 
Citizens (NR)
Resident 
Citizens (RC)
85%
15%
10 %
90 %
Affected by 
decisions of 
the €demos‹
€Demos‹
 
Figure 2. Electoral Residential Inclusiveness 
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This imaginary country has a population of 10 million adult inhabitants (and for the sake of the 
explanation, let us forget about kids for the moment). About 85% of its adults are citizens and 15% non-
citizen residents. The estimated diaspora is about 1,000,000, but in practical terms, just 850,000 
individuals are registered to vote. The diaspora constitutes 10% of the whole citizenry. Thus, there are 
8,500,000, of which, 7,650,000 are resident citizens. As we want to find the degree of congruence between 
those who make the law and those who suffer it, we discount from all those who abide by the law all 
those who do not have a say in the law making process and those who, having a say, do not suffer the 
consequences.  
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅=  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅
 ∗  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸ℎ𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  = 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶(𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 + 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅) ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶(𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 + 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)  = 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 = 90(90 + 10) ∗ 85(85 + 15)  =  0.90 ∗ 0.85 =  77% 
 
While this example was made just for the sake of explanation, the used numbers are not purely a 
coincidence. In fact, they are largely based on the average distribution among these groups of individuals 
(RC, NR, NC) at the top 25% of regimes sorted by Electoral Democracy Index. Actually, if we take the 
45 countries with the highest level of democracy based on V-Dem v.9 for the year 2018, their diasporas 
represent an average of 11.2% and the non-citizen residents represent 8.4% the population (14% if we 
just take the top 10 democracies). I will return to these numbers in the next section. 
2.b. Data  
While there is excellent data on populations, data on electoral rights based on citizenship statuses are 
more difficult to find. This is an area where good data is lacking, and it is becoming more critical due to 
increasing migration flows. Data on national populations and their diasporas (by birth) comes from the 
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Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, of the United Nations. Two databases 
were consulted in particular: the migrant stock and the migrant stock by origin and destination.20  
Data of non-citizen residents comes from national statistics bureaus and institutes, the European Union 
(Eurostat), and estimations made by NGOs and scholars (the United States, and Uruguay). Although it 
is possible to know the overseas-born population that lives in a host country, these do not necessarily 
count as non-citizen residents because many of these might have naturalized. Not every person born in 
a given country should be automatically considered as a citizen, particularly if the hosting country is 
strongly based on a jus sanguinis criterion of citizenship.   
As data of non-citizen residents is usually aggregated regarding its age distribution, one problem 
that arises is how to calculate how many of those could acquire electoral rights. For this research, I assume 
that this group of people has a similar age distribution than the overall population of the hosting country. 
Eventually, the ideal would be to compare the proportion of adults of this population to adults of the 
whole population. While it is possible to argue that the age distribution is different between both groups, 
and therefore, the percentage of adults should change accordingly, it is assumed that this difference is 
likely most significant in the context of refugees, which are excluded here.   
Data on non-resident citizens comes from national electoral commissions, governments (usually 
interior ministries), and, in some cases, also from national statistics bureaus. Here, we also face similar 
problems to those described for non-citizen residents. For example, we may know how many Italian-
born people live in Argentina, but this is hugely different from knowing how many Italian citizens live 
there as their descendants may also have Italian electoral rights and qualify as non-resident citizens.  
For this research, it is essential to differentiate between diasporas and non-resident citizens of a 
country. The diaspora of a country is understood as the group of individuals who, having been born in a 
given country, live overseas. By non-resident citizens, I understand the group of individuals with electoral 
rights who live outside the limits of the country in question. Usually, non-resident citizens are a subset of 
the diaspora and consequently, both numbers differ substantially. In case a state does not allow overseas 
voting (e.g., Denmark, Uruguay), the group of non-resident citizens equals zero. This value of zero is 
maintained regardless of the fact that, in some instances, members of diplomatic staff abroad might have 
electoral rights (e.g., Armenia, Ireland, Israel).  
                                                        20  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). International Migrant 
Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019). 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp  
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2.c. Measurement  
I speculate that the level of democracy of contemporary regimes will be significantly altered if instead of 
considering the extent of suffrage among citizens we consider the Electoral Residential Inclusiveness proposed 
above. My intuition is that taking into consideration this index would re-order the highly consistent 
picture indices of democracy currently provide.21 Thus, in order to test how significant the alternative I 
am proposing is, I substitute the suffrage measure of V-Dem with the territorial measure of inclusion. I 
opt to use V-Dem because it is the most transparent index available and the only large-N study spelling 
out the components of its polyarchy scores as well as the aggregation rules.  
V-Dem is characterized by a “radical disaggregation,” and its polyarchy scores are built on forty 
indicators, aggregated around five “lower level democracy and governance” indices, which are 
concomitantly aggregated into two mid-level indices, which at the end are combined to produce the 
overall polyarchy score. While each polyarchy component is a combination of multiple indicators (e.g. 
elected officials, clean elections), the suffrage component consist in only one indicator: “Inclusive 
Citizenship” [v2x_suffr] that captures the extension of the suffrage as the proportion of “adult citizens 
eligible to vote” (Teorell et al. 2019:79, italics are mine).  
Table A.1 shows the V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Scores and its components (v.9) for the top 
45 countries in 2018, which represent the top 25% polyarchies of all countries V-Dem covers. As seen, 
the indicator of suffrage is a constant, having its maximum value in each and every case. Actually, for the 
year 2018, with the exception of four countries (Somalia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia), all countries and polities in the world covered by V-Dem have a perfect v2x_suffr score, which 
makes us wonder about its statistical utility when used cross-sectionally in the present.   
Based on the distribution of NC, NR, and RC, Table 2 spells out the ERI scores for the top 45 
democracies in the world in the year 2018 based on V-Dem v.9. For this sample, ERI has an average of 
0.89, with a maximum of 0.999 (Taiwan) and minimum of 0.412 (Luxembourg). Sorting Table 3 by ERI, 
the countries with a virtually complete score are Taiwan, Chile, Uruguay, Jamaica, and Japan. On the 
contrary, the countries with the lowest ERI are Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Switzerland, and Luxembourg.22   
                                                        21  Most cross-national and longitudinal indices of democracy are strongly correlated at least in their aggregate scores, 
see Bernhard et al (2017: 953). 
22  I hope future work will extend the data presented here in order to allow for longitudinal analysis. Nonetheless, I 
expect this cross-sectional analysis will serve as a platform for more ambitious and resourceful projects. Doubtless 
these data have errors, thus they must be taken with caution. 
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If Switzerland was a blunt case of political segmentation of people’s rights (with an ERI of .722), 
Luxembourg is even a more extreme case with an ERI of 0.412, by far the lowest of the whole sample. 
By any standard, it is the wealthiest country in Europe (based on PPP), and it is located at the very heart 
of the European Union. Yet, about half of its permanent population has no electoral rights and possesses 
a significant diaspora deciding the rules of the game. This fact does not mean that people living in 
Luxembourg are unhappy, miserable, or exploited people without resources or any freedoms. But 
democracy is not about happiness and riches; it is about freedom, political equity, and rights.  
[Table 2 about here]  
Now let me proceed to check the hypothesis that taking into consideration the Electoral Residential 
Inclusiveness would significantly re-order the highly consistent picture indices of democracy currently 
provide. To do so, in Table 3, I substitute V-Dem’s v2x_suffr with ERI to calculate the new polyarchic 
score for each country, maintaining the remaining sub-indices and indicators as they originally were.  
Three columns are particularly interesting. The first is the ranking of democracies using the original 
Rankv2x_suffr , then a new ranking is offered (RankERI), which is the polyarchy score using RankERI, and 
finally the difference between both. The polyarchy winners (based on ERI) are Taiwan, which makes a 
colossal jump of 25 places (from the 37th place to the 12th), Mauritius (+19, 28 → 9), Japan (+18, 34→ 
16), Jamaica (+15, 35 → 20), and Lithuania (+14, 36 → 14). The polyarchy losers are Latvia (-14, 24 → 
38), Italy (-18, 11 → 29), Estonia (-27, 3 → 30), Switzerland (-28, 7 → 35), and finally, Luxembourg (-
36, 9 → 45). 
Though the participation indicator represents only 12.5% of V–Dem’s electoral democracy score, 
it exerts a strong enough power to significantly alter the more or less established sorting of countries. For 
example, if we use v2x_suffrage, European continental countries lead the world with (8 cases out of the 
top 10). Substituting v2x_suffrage by ERI, that proportion is reduced by half with only four coming from 
this region (DKN, SWE, NED, NOR). Moreover, doing this exercise, the democratic picture we obtain 
is much more geographically evenly distributed as the new top 10 list includes one country from Oceania 
(New Zealand), one from Asia (South Korea), one from Africa (Mauritius), and a second one from Latin 
America (Chile), as Uruguay was already included.  
[Table 3 about here]  
It could be argued that small countries, by their nature, will have more significant diasporas, and therefore, 
a larger ERI than large countries. This is because their population, for example, facing stressful situations 
in the context of small markets, will have higher incentives to find jobs overseas and emigrate. 
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Nonetheless, even assuming this is correct, larger countries will have more copious amounts of non-
citizen residents, compensating for the migrants of the smaller societies. In other words, due to the 
architecture of ERI, I expect these migration waves to neutralize each other. To check for this potential 
neutralization between denizens and ex-pats, I control the correlation between population size and ERI. 
The results are crystal clear; there is no correlation between the variables whatsoever (r: 0.13, sig. .36).  
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Table 2. Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (circa 2018) 
Country 
(Sorted by 
IDE, V-
Dem, v.9) 
Total 
Populatio
n (UN 
data) 
Diaspor
a / Pop. 
Estimate
d 
diaspora 
(only by 
birth) 
Non-
Citizen 
Residents 
(NC) 
NC
/ 
PO
P 
Total 
citizens 
(NR + 
RC) 
Resident 
Citizens 
(RC) 
Non-
Resident 
Citizens 
(NR) 
% NR 
/ Total 
Citizen
s 
RC / 
Demos 
RC / 
Affec
ted 
Electoral 
Residential 
Inclusivenes
s (ERI) 
Norway  5,378,857 3.8 205,377 567,611 10.6 3,765,245 3,726,245 39,00023 1.04 0.990 0.894 0.885 
Sweden 10,036,379 3.6 359,772 932,266 9.3 7,495,936 7,325,733 170,203 2.27 0.977 0.907 0.887 
Estonia 1,325,648 15.7 208,270 199,158 15.0 887,420 809,539 77,881 8.78 0.912 0.850 0.775 
Costa Rica 5,047,561 3.0 150,415 417,768* 8.3 3,322,329 3,285,691 36,638 1.10 0.989 0.917 0.907 
Denmark 5,771,876 4.4 255,665 531,278 9.2 4,219,537 4,219,537 . . 1.000 0.908 0.908 
Uruguay  3,461,734 10.7 371,169 50,727 1.5 2,699,980 2,699,980 . . 0.997 1.000 0.997 
Switzerland 8,586,550 8.1 699,650 2,165,289 25.2 5,460,268 5,275,175 185,093 3.39 0.966 0.748 0.722 
UK 67,530,172 7.0 4,729,088 6,171,948 9.1 47,587,254 47,353,258 233,996 0.49 0.995 0.909 0.904 
Luxembourg  615,729 12.3 75,472 288,009 46.8 259,887 201,019 58,86824 22.65 0.773 0.532 0.412 
Portugal 10,226,187 21.1 2,155,792 480,300 4.7 10,777,258 9,312,621 1,464,637 13.59 0.864 0.953 0.824 
Italy 60,550,075 5.1 3,078,697 5,255,503 8.7 50,736,204 46,505,350 4,230,854 8.34 0.917 0.913 0.837 
New 
 
4,783,063 16.5 787,715 1,068,739 22.3 3,253,383 3,191,859 61,524 1.89 0.981 1.000 0.981 
South Korea 51,225,308 4.5 2,307,369 136,334 0.3 42,479,710 42,185,077 294,633 0.69 0.993 0.997 0.990 
Belgium 11,539,328 5.0 581,813 1,391,425 12.1 8,167,709 7,989,802 177,907 2.18 0.978 0.879 0.860 
Australia 25,203,198 2.3 577,338 2,166,016 8.6 16,424,248 16,324,509 99,739 0.61 0.994 0.914 0.909 
Iceland 339,031 12.4 42,188 34,460 10.2 248,485 235,024 13,461 5.42 0.946 0.898 0.850 
Netherlands 17,097,130 5.7 981,097 914,997 5.4 12,893,466 12,812,806 80,660 0.63 0.994 0.946 0.941 
Finland 5,532,156 5.2 290,042 257,572 4.7 4,510,040 4,255,466 254,574 5.64 0.944 0.953 0.900 
Chile 18,952,038 3.4 650,255 835,197 4.4 14,347,288 14,308,151 39,137 0.27 0.997 1.000 0.997 
Canada 37,411,047 3.5 1,323,087 2,425,480 6.5 27,126,166 27,076,166 50,000 0.18 0.998 0.935 0.933 
France 65,129,728 3.5 2,296,944 4,605,669 7.1 47,582,183 46,316,953 1,265,230 2.66 0.973 0.929 0.905 
Cyprus 1,198,575 17.9 214,664 139,606 11.6 550,876 539,193 11,683 2.12 0.979 0.884 0.865 
Ireland 4,882,495 16.7 816,908 578,782 11.9 3,401,681 3,401,681 . . 1.000 0.881 0.881 
Latvia 1,906,743 17.4 332,243 272,531 14.3 1,548,673 1,413,867 134,806 8.70 0.913 0.857 0.782 
Germany 83,517,045 4.8 4,014,770 10,624,000 12.7 61,688,485 61,575,496 112,989 0.18 0.998 0.873 0.871 
                                                        23  The 39,000 registered citizens is a guess made by the Norwegian statistical agency. 
24  Based on the UN's data on diasporas (UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination), I know that for the year 2019, there were 75,472 Luxembourgers overseas. 
Assuming that the age structure of the diaspora is somewhat similar to that of Luxembourgers in Luxembourg, that percentage would represent 58,868 citizens.  
19  
Country 
(Sorted by 
IDE, V-
Dem, v.9) 
Total 
Populatio
n (UN 
data) 
Diaspor
a / Pop. 
Estimate
d 
diaspora 
(only by 
birth) 
Non-
Citizen 
Residents 
(NC) 
NC
/ 
PO
P 
Total 
citizens 
(NR + 
RC) 
Resident 
Citizens 
(RC) 
Non-
Resident 
Citizens 
(NR) 
% NR 
/ Total 
Citizen
s 
RC / 
Demos 
RC / 
Affec
ted 
Electoral 
Residential 
Inclusivenes
s (ERI) 
USA  329,064,91
 
1.7 5,500,000 24,316,00025 7.4 250,056,00
 
247,056,00
 
3,000,000 1.20 0.988 0.926 0.915 
Greece 10,473,455 9.9 1,039,501 831,692 7.9 9,984,934 9,984,934 . . 1.000 0.921 0.921 
Mauritius 1,269,668 14.8 188,406 28,849* 2.3 941,719 941,719 . . 1.000 0.977 0.977 
Slovakia 5,457,013 6.6 357,799 65,840 1.2 4,432,419 4,428,303 4,116 0.09 0.999 0.988 0.987 
Slovenia 2,078,654 6.9 143,805 121,875 5.9 1,712,676 1,615,907 96,769 5.65 0.943 0.941 0.888 
Czechia 10,689,209 8.5 911,469 564,345 5.3 8,362,987 8,341,408 21,579 0.26 0.997 0.947 0.945 
Argentina 44,780,677 2.3 1,013,489 2,212,879 4.9 33,858,733 33,473,075 385,658 1.14 0.989 0.951 0.940 
Spain 46,736,776 3.0 1,408,947 5,025,264 10.8 37,001,219 34,870,482 2,130,737 5.76 0.942 0.892 0.841 
Japan 126,860,30
 
0.7 838,957 1,079,013 0.9 106,091,22
 
105,991,13
 
100,090 0.09 0.999 0.991 0.991 
Jamaica 2,948,279 37.7 1,111,559 23,468 0.8 1,824,412 1,824,412 . . 1.000 0.992 0.992 
Lithuania 2,759,627 22.1 610,242 47,186 1.7 2,486,915 2,426,275 60,640 2.44 0.976 0.983 0.959 
Taiwan 23,773,876 8.3 1,981,000 17,947 0.1 19,311,105 19,311,105 . . 1.000 0.999 0.999 
Austria 8,955,102 6.4 576,011 1,427,105 15.9 6,396,812 6,334,859 61,953 0.97 0.990 0.841 0.832 
Panama 4,246,439 3.8 162,258 185,072 4.4 2,757,823 2,750,149 7,674 0.28 0.997 0.956 0.954 
Trin. & To. 1,394,973 28.7 400,014 59,249 4.2 1,099,279 1,099,279 . . 1.000 0.958 0.958 
Suriname 581,372 48.9 284,568 46,157 7.9 356,223 356,223 . . 1.000 0.921 0.921 
Cape Verde 549,935 33.9 186,372 15,664 2.8 347,622 302,942 44,680 12.85 0.871 0.972 0.847 
Barbados 287,025 39.4 112,980 34,807 12.1 255,833 255,833 . . 1.000 0.879 0.879 
Timor-Leste 1,293,119 3.0 39,202 8,417 0.7 784,286 778,041 6,245 0.80 0.992 0.993 0.986 
Peru 32,510,453 4.7 1,544,212 782,169 2.4 22,901,954 22,017,030 884,924 3.86 0.961 0.976 0.938 
 
 
                                                        
25  The United States is one of the most difficult countries regarding population statistics. Non-citizen residents are estimated by combining the 13,300,000 (lawful 
permanent residents, also known as “green card” holders) from https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/population-estimates/LPR with the 11,016,000 illegal 
permanent immigrants from https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-dozen-facts-about-immigration/. The estimation for the diaspora size and the diaspora 
electorate comes from the Federal Voting Assistance Program (https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/overseas-citizen-population-analysis).  
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Table 3. Ranking differences between Electoral Democracy Index based on v2x_suff and 
Electoral Democracy Index based on ERI 
Country Electoral 
Democracy 
Index 
(EDIv2x_suffr) 
Rank 
(EDIv2x_suffr) 
Electoral 
Democracy 
Index  
(EDIERI) 
Rank 
(EDIERI) 
Differences 
between 
Rankings 
(Rankv2x_suffr - -
RankERI) 1. Norway 0.913 1 0.845 10 -9 
2. Sweden 0.903 2 0.855 5 -3 
3. Estonia 0.901 3 0.795 30 -27 
4. Costa Rica 0.896 4 0.854 6 -2 
5. Denmark 0.888 5 0.864 3 2 
6. Uruguay 0.884 6 0.889 1 5 
7. Switzerland 0.881 7 0.767 35 -28 
8. United Kingdom 0.875 8 0.827 15 -7 
9. Luxembourg 0.874 9 0.607 45 -36 
10. Portugal 0.874 10 0.804 23 -13 
11. Italy 0.873 11 0.796 29 -18 
12. New Zealand 0.873 12 0.874 2 10 
13. South Korea 0.867 13 0.861 4 9 
14. Belgium 0.866 14 0.810 19 -5 
15. Australia 0.864 15 0.833 13 2 
16. Iceland 0.861 16 0.804 24 -8 
17. Netherlands 0.861 17 0.848 8 9 
18. Finland 0.855 18 0.830 14 4 
19. Chile 0.852 19 0.852 7 12 
20. Canada 0.850 20 0.835 11 9 
21. France 0.850 21 0.821 17 4 
22. Cyprus 0.846 22 0.797 28 -6 
23. Ireland 0.846 23 0.802 27 -4 
24. Latvia 0.846 24 0.750 38 -14 
25. Germany 0.838 25 0.795 31 -6 
26. United States  0.834 26 0.802 26 0 
27. Greece 0.831 27 0.804 25 2 
28. Mauritius 0.825 28 0.845 9 19 
29. Slovakia 0.824 29 0.819 18 11 
30. Slovenia 0.824 30 0.782 33 -3 
31. Czech Republic 0.822 31 0.807 21 10 
32. Argentina 0.819 32 0.789 32 0 
33. Spain 0.819 33 0.781 34 -1 
34. Japan 0.808 34 0.823 16 18 
35. Jamaica 0.807 35 0.808 20 15 
36. Lithuania 0.803 36 0.804 22 14 
37. Taiwan 0.801 37 0.834 12 25 
38. Austria 0.790 38 0.734 43 -5 
39. Panama 0.788 39 0.765 36 3 
40. Trin. and Tobago 0.786 40 0.764 37 3 
41. Suriname 0.772 41 0.746 39 2 
42. Cape Verde 0.769 42 0.724 44 -2 
43. Barbados 0.768 43 0.738 42 1 
44. Timor-Leste 0.755 44 0.744 40 4 
45. Peru 0.753 45 0.740 41 4 
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3. Conclusions 
The legitimacy of democracy is founded on the consent of the governed (Bobbio 1987). We abide by the 
democratic decisions of our communities because we have a chance to participate in making such 
decisions and, in case we dislike them, we have the opportunity to change them using pre-established 
ways to do so. Actually, “the core of democratic self-governance is the ideal of public autonomy, namely, 
the principle that those who are subject to the law should also be its authors” (Benhabib 2004: 217). As 
a member of a political community, the government we choose affects us, and only those who are 
comprehensively affected by a government should participate in electing that government democratically. 
Residence, as Carens (2002) justifies, should be the criterion for granting electoral rights.  
Yet, most significant measures of democracy are not sensitive enough to the contemporary 
composition of societies, where individuals of different status coexist. This is particularly significant due 
to recent migration flows. Ignoring the problem has not resolved the issue; it is virtually inescapable. 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, all measures of democracy take sides in these matters. The mere fact that 
almost a third of the permanent population in a country does not have political rights and that this does 
not affect its level of democracy implies—necessarily—that this aspect does not play a significant role in 
measuring the democratic level of a country. Of course, each author or measurement has the freedom to 
define democracy as they see fit, but being insensitive to this dimension directly attacks the polyarchical 
conceptual minimum that has prevailed in the specialized literature. Participation should not be taken for 
granted.  
The index of Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) is firmly anchored in the literature, 
particularly the canon of positive democratic theory. ERI forces us to be more transparent, coherent, and 
consistent in our efforts to measure democracy. Transparent in the sense of being clear about what we 
are measuring, coherent with democratic theory, and consistent along with each case. If the results are 
not convincing, and yet we are sure that ERI is better than what we had before, then we should reconsider 
which indicators constitute the core of our democracy indices and how they should be aggregated.  
I am not contending that this research objective of measuring residential electoral democracy is 
necessarily better than measures based on ethnonational ideas of the demos, the people. I do argue, 
however, that this perspective is at least as valid as the national one. Therefore, one implication of this 
research is that measures of democracy need to be explicit about these complex normative decisions. The 
critical question we should ask ourselves when intending to measure the democratic level of nations: are 
we measuring how democratic Swiss are or are we measuring how democratic Switzerland is?   
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Annex 
Table A.1. V-Dem’s 2018 Polyarchy Scores and its components (v.9) for top 45 countries26 
Rank Country Electoral 
Democrac
y Index27   
Multiplicativ
e polyarchy 
index  
Additive 
polyarchy 
index  
Elected 
officials 
index 
(v2x_elecof
f) 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(v2xel_frefair
) 
Freedom of 
association 
index 
(v2x_frassoc_t
hick) 
Share of 
population 
with 
suffrage 
(v2x_suffr) 
Freedom of 
expression and alt. 
sources of inf. 
index 
(v2x_freexp_altinf
) 
1 Norway 0.913 0.863 0.964 1 0.956 0.914 1 0.964 
2 Sweden 0.903 0.846 0.960 1 0.969 0.925 1 0.957 
3 Estonia 0.901 0.843 0.959 1 0.971 0.902 1 0.969 
4 Costa Rica 0.896 0.835 0.957 1 0.973 0.917 1 0.941 
5 Denmark 0.888 0.823 0.953 1 0.951 0.927 1 0.971 
6 Uruguay 0.884 0.816 0.951 1 0.969 0.884 1 0.964 
7 Switzerland 0.881 0.811 0.950 1 0.948 0.914 1 0.975 
8 United 
 
0.875 0.802 0.947 1 0.940 0.893 1 0.949 
9 Luxembourg 0.874 0.801 0.947 1 0.962 0.886 1 0.957 
10 Portugal 0.874 0.802 0.947 1 0.975 0.892 1 0.946 
11 Italy 0.873 0.800 0.947 1 0.938 0.904 1 0.939 
12 New Zealand 0.873 0.800 0.947 1 0.955 0.910 1 0.938 
13 South Korea 0.867 0.790 0.944 1 0.954 0.870 1 0.949 
14 Belgium 0.866 0.789 0.944 1 0.964 0.869 1 0.958 
15 Australia 0.864 0.786 0.943 1 0.965 0.908 1 0.917 
16 Iceland 0.861 0.781 0.941 1 0.944 0.894 1 0.949 
17 Netherlands 0.861 0.780 0.941 1 0.966 0.886 1 0.939 
18 Finland 0.855 0.771 0.939 1 0.968 0.867 1 0.959 
19 Chile 0.852 0.766 0.937 1 0.963 0.895 1 0.892 
20 Canada 0.850 0.763 0.936 1 0.944 0.888 1 0.939 
21 France 0.850 0.764 0.937 1 0.948 0.863 1 0.96 
22 Cyprus 0.846 0.758 0.935 1 0.921 0.891 1 0.947 
23 Ireland 0.846 0.757 0.935 1 0.913 0.879 1 0.961 
24 Latvia 0.846 0.758 0.934 1 0.899 0.896 1 0.942                                                         
26  For a complete picture of the Structure of Aggregation of V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index, see Coppedge et al. (2019a: 28 and 343), Pemstein et al. (2015).  
27  Aggregation: v2x_polyarchy = (0.5 * MPI + 0.5 * API) = (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) + (.125*v2x_elecoff + 
.25*v2xel_frefair + .25*v2x_frassoc_thick + .125*v2x_suffr + .25*v2x_freexp_altinf) 
23  
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) 
25 Germany 0.838 0.744 0.931 1 0.951 0.862 1 0.936 
26 USA 0.834 0.739 0.929 1 0.877 0.933 1 0.916 
27 Greece 0.831 0.735 0.928 1 0.949 0.897 1 0.876 
28 Mauritius 0.825 0.726 0.925 1 0.944 0.890 1 0.919 
29 Slovakia 0.824 0.725 0.924 1 0.945 0.868 1 0.883 
30 Slovenia 0.824 0.724 0.924 1 0.926 0.903 1 0.878 
31 Czech Rep. 0.822 0.722 0.923 1 0.923 0.872 1 0.913 
32 Argentina 0.819 0.717 0.922 1 0.891 0.901 1 0.884 
33 Spain 0.819 0.712 0.927 0.945 0.966 0.892 1 0.935 
34 Japan 0.808 0.699 0.916 1 0.926 0.906 1 0.868 
35 Jamaica 0.807 0.698 0.916 1 0.864 0.889 1 0.918 
36 Lithuania 0.803 0.692 0.915 1 0.921 0.859 1 0.911 
37 Taiwan 0.801 0.688 0.913 1 0.918 0.895 1 0.9 
38 Austria 0.790 0.672 0.908 1 0.946 0.823 1 0.887 
39 Panama 0.788 0.670 0.908 1 0.889 0.880 1 0.846 
40 Trin. and Tob. 0.786 0.665 0.906 1 0.833 0.893 1 0.885 
41 Suriname 0.772 0.645 0.899 1 0.891 0.841 1 0.872 
42 Cape Verde 0.769 0.641 0.898 1 0.876 0.884 1 0.859 
43 Barbados 0.768 0.638 0.897 1 0.813 0.879 1 0.931 
44 Timor-Leste 0.755 0.620 0.891 1 0.872 0.830 1 0.845 
45 Peru 0.753 0.616 0.890 1 0.854 0.832 1 0.89 
Source: (Coppedge et al. 2019b).  
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